

The Social Democratic Prospect

by Sidney Hook

Also:

Social Democracy and America

1976 Convention Statement of
Social Democrats, U.S.A.

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A friend of many years standing who heard that I was to give the keynote speech at the convention of Social Democrats wrote me in genuine puzzlement. "I know what a Democrat is and I know what a Socialist is, but what is a Social Democrat, and why is he or she necessary?" This is a fair question and I propose to answer it this morning.

Let us begin with the term "democracy" with a small "d." Most briefly put, a democrat is one who believes that governmental rule should rest upon the freely-given consent of the governed. In this sense, all political parties, except the Communist and other totalitarian groupings, whatever their differing economic and social programs, are democrats. In this sense, political democracy is necessary for every other kind of democracy, for without it, no other kind is possible or even meaningful. And this is no mere truism but an important assertion when counterposed to the claim that although totalitarian societies lack political democracy, they enjoy economic or ethnic or cultural democracy. For it should be clear that without the strategic freedoms of speech, press, assembly, organization, and the rights of criticism and dissent—which constitute the very nature of political democracy—there can be no economic or ethnic or cultural democracy.

Very well, then, granted that political democracy is always essential to any conception of democracy, what is the difference between the political democrat—whether he is a member of the Republican, Democratic, Conservative, or Libertarian parties, and the Social Democrat?

The difference, I submit, is this: for the Social Democrat, democracy is not merely a political concept but a moral one. It is democracy as a way of life. What is "democracy as a way of life"? It is a society whose basic institutions are animated by an equality of concern for all human beings, regardless of class, race, sex, religion, and national origin, to develop themselves as *persons* to their fullest growth, to be free to live up to their desirable potentials as human beings. It is possible for human beings to be politically equal as voters but yet so unequal in educational, economic, and social opportunities, that ultimately even the nature of their political equality is affected.

The Social Democrat therefore is interested in extending the area of equal opportunity beyond the political sphere to all other areas of social life. He believes that all social institutions to the extent to which they are modifiable must be judged by their fruits or consequences on the lives of individual persons. It is from this premise of "democracy as a way of life," of equal opportunity for all to develop themselves as persons, taken as a regulative moral ideal, not as an inexorable, "dialectical" law of history, that the social democrat derives the justification for multiple programs of social reform—whether it be social security, health and unemployment insurance, a guaranteed minimum family income, occupational safety, or improved and extended public education.

I shall have more to say about social democracy as a moral ideal later but now to the second half of the question: How is social democracy related to socialism? It all depends, of course, upon how "socialism" is understood. Unfortunately socialism has been identified too often, not with the moral ends of democracy as a way of life, but only with one of the *means* by which some socialists in the past hoped that those moral ends could be furthered, viz., with collectivism or the nationalization of all means of production, distribution, and exchange. Unfortunately, socialists have made a fetish of the means without considering the consequences of those means on professed ends or goals. Unfortunately, socialism has been too often identified with a social system in which there is no vestige of political democracy, and in which the slightest expression of dissent brings penalties that have varied from tortured exile in the camps of the Gulag Archipelago, to confinement in insane asylums. The consequence has been that the workers and peasants have suffered more and enjoyed less freedom in the nationalized economies of the "socialist" countries of the world than in the non-socialist democratic societies of the West. Unfortunately, socialism has too often been identified with a police state in which the inhabitants are penned in by walls, electrified fences, and minefields, and no one is free to leave. Unfortunately, this historical conjunction of socialism and terror has strengthened a widely held view that the only alternative open to those who love freedom is support of the free enterprise system, that any movement away from capitalism as an economic system involves the abandonment of freedom and democracy.

Freedom and Property

This complex of historical, theoretical, and psychological misfortunes necessitates that we rethink the basic question of property and human freedom, that we liberate ourselves from the traditional clichés and slogans of socialism, and develop new philosophical foundations for a human democratic society. That, it seems to me, is one of the tasks of contemporary social democracy.

We must begin by clearing the ground of some theoretical confusions. We sometimes hear human rights contrasted with property rights. That is a mistake. A property right is a human right. Our very personality and its expression, as William James so cogently showed in his *Principles of Psychology*, depends upon the possession of property in the things we own, our clothes, our tools, our pictures, our books, our homes. Even our human right to speak our minds and publish our thoughts depends upon the possession of some property in means of communication—be it no more than the typewriter and paper. But this kind of property is *personal* property—and one of the standard criticisms of traditional capitalism is that it has resulted in an inequitable distribution of personal property among individuals, on which the development of personality depends. (In comparison with other economic systems of the past, capitalism has been a veritable cornucopia of plenty but the distribution of that plenty in terms of personal property has been haphazard and inequitable, characterized periodically by a surfeit for some and a lack of essential goods and services for many more regardless of merit or desert.)

What is true of *personal* property, however, is not necessarily true of *social* property in the large scale means of production in an industrial society. If I have any human rights as a person, I have some rights to the food, shelter, clothing, education, without which these rights are a nullity. But I cannot reasonably contend that my human rights require not only *personal* property but *social* property in the mills, factories, mines, and fields on which the livelihood of others depends. For property in the social means of production gives not only power over inanimate things but over the persons whose lives and welfare depend on their use. In this sector, property means power over human beings. Let us see why.

After all, how do we know that we have a right to property or ownership of anything? Not by mere possession. For what I can dispossess you of, you in turn can dispossess me of. Not by power of use. I may own a great many things I am unable to use or whose use is restricted by law. Normally one cannot use one's home for a glue factory or a hospital where zoning laws exist. Legally, ownership gives power not to use or abuse but power to *exclude others* from the use of what I own. Ownership of land or factory on which the livelihood of others depends gives me power to exclude them from its use or to control the conditions of its use. Where there are no other resources at hand, like an open frontier, my ownership of land or factory therefore gives me a very real power over the lives of those and their families whose income depends on their employment.

From the point of view of democracy as a way of life, since power over the instruments of production means power over the human beings who must live by them, this power, like all power, must be socially *responsible*. It cannot be unlimited. Otherwise, all sorts of inequities would develop. With the development of free trade unions and certain kinds of protective labor legislation in democratic capitalist countries of the West, there has been an impressive movement toward sharing this power. Social Democrats wish to make this shared power more responsible.

On the other hand, where in so-called socialist countries the instruments of social production have been collectivized or nationalized, without the presence of political democracy, the workers on farms or in factories have even less control over their lives than in the most ruthless days of uncontrolled Western capitalism. They can be barred from work and permanently blacklisted or herded to distant places at the command of a small minority which exercises a monopoly of interlocking military, judicial and economic powers. The agents of this minority decree with the awful authority of a ubiquitous secret police what the conditions and rewards of work shall be. If we define property *functionally*, in terms of access to and control of property, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that, in the absence of forms of democratic participation and free trade unions with a legally recognized right to strike, the collectivized economy of present-day socialist states is the property of the closed political corporation that goes by the name of the

Communist Party. Where there is no right to strike, we have a system of forced labor. Where there is no independent judiciary, there is no defense against trumped up charges and frame-ups. Where there is no legally recognized political opposition which enables a minority peacefully to become a majority, the regime, despite its semantic disguises, rests on terror. The resoluteness of organized Communist terror is evidenced by the fact that in contrast to other totalitarian and authoritarian regimes no Communist regime that has seized power since Lenin's day has ever been overthrown. (The only exceptions were minor areas in Central Europe.)

Freedom and Free Enterprise

In this connection we must say a word or two about the contentions of conservative thinkers like Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman who contend that any attempt to regulate free enterprise is sure to bring with it the erosion of political and cultural freedom, and the inevitable triumph of an industrial serfdom. Such a position, it seems to me, can only be held in defiance of the verifiable historical facts.

First, in every country in the world, without exception, in which economic collectivism now exists, the destruction of political democratic institutions preceded the introduction of the collectivist economy. It was only after the Constituent Assembly, the last democratic institution that existed in Russia, was forcibly dissolved, and the minority Communist Party dictatorship set up in the Soviet Union, that the collectivist economy was established. It was only after the Red Army destroyed all prospects of democratic political life in the satellite nations, that they followed suit. And if the Nazi and Fascist command economies be regarded as a species of collectivism, it is just as obvious that they followed on the violent death of democracy.

Secondly, the largely state-controlled economies of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, and England, whatever their difficulties, exist in countries in which there has been no abatement of traditional liberties.

Most important of all, in our own country, the intervention of the state into the economy, by direct and indirect subsidies, through tariffs and regulatory agencies, has resulted in the emergence of a substantial public sector. The

free enterprise economic system of Adam Smith no more exists today in the U.S.A. than the socialism of Karl Marx in the U.S.S.R. Notice, however, that if the Hayek-Friedman analysis were valid, the rise of the public sector should have been accompanied by a progressive restriction on our political and cultural freedoms. Yet the precise opposite has occurred. With respect to every area of political and civil rights in this country, with respect to the variety, vehemence, and scope of articulate dissent, our freedom is greater today than it has ever been, especially in the halcyon days of unregulated capitalism. To be sure, there have been bureaucratic excesses that are foolish, and sometimes vicious, as in some of the guidelines of HEW prescribing numerical goals and quotas in employment, but the remedies for them are available to an aroused citizenry.

As social democrats we frankly recognize that there is a totalitarian potential in any economy which is completely centralized and nationalized. For if political democracy is ever lost, such an economy can become the most powerful engine of repression in human history. In economics as in politics, power must limit power even at the cost of some efficiency. Therefore every move towards government intervention must be carefully weighed for its consequences on the basic freedoms of society. We prefer to leave to private initiative the gratification of social needs if that does not impose onerous costs, burdens, and deceptions on the community. But if these social needs cannot be properly met by private initiative, then the community must accept responsibility for them in the same way that it should provide police and health protection for individuals regardless of their capacity to pay. This responsibility must extend to the employment of those able and willing to work but who for no fault of their own lack the opportunity. When an earthquake levels a city or a plague sweeps a community, we recognize our obligation to alleviate the conditions of the victims. When mass unemployment strikes a society with the effect of a natural disaster, why should our obligation be any less?

We social democrats, therefore, yield to none in putting freedom first. We find that sometimes those who also say that they put freedom first really mean they put the freedom to make profit first. There is room for a fair return on investment and entrepreneurial talent but where issues arise that involve the safety and security of democratic institutions and the basic welfare

of the working population, considerations of efficiency and financial responsibility, although always relevant, must be counterbalanced by our concern for human beings. We must regiment *things* sometimes in order *not* to regiment *people*.

In no sphere of life is this so apparent as in international affairs. Other speakers on the program today will discuss the international scene in more detail but I want to relate the central issue of our era to the theme of *freedom first*.

In our age of military nuclear technology, in which the sudden death of cultures is possible—something unique in human history—foreign policy has an overriding importance. In the present juncture of events it is no exaggeration to say that the outcome of existing international tensions, within the lifetime of most of you assembled here, will determine the political future of the Western World in the next century. As the international situation has grown potentially more dangerous, peace has rested on "the precarious balance of terror" between the two great super powers—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. That balance can be easily upset if one side acquires a disproportionate superiority over the other, or if one side loses its credibility in the eyes of its adversary as a potential combatant, either because it is unable to defend itself or, because of loss of faith in its way of life or failure of nerve, it is unwilling to do so.

The foreign policy of a democracy, as well as its domestic policy, reflects many elements and interests. But it cannot have any coherence unless it also reflects its common ideals too. Foreign policy ought never to become a football of domestic politics, and especially not in an election year.

My point of departure is that the prospects of a world government able to compose international tensions in a just fashion is extremely remote. The United Nations today, far from creating a unified public world opinion that would support efforts to resolve conflicts among nations, if possible peacefully and if not, equitably, has itself become a cockpit in which these tensions are often exacerbated. Witness its infamous resolution condemning Israel, which is in perpetual danger of extermination from its enemies, as a threat to world peace, and the equating of Zionism with racialism.

There are many social conflicts in the world today that flow from national and racial

differences, conflicts over frontiers and access to raw materials, but they are all eclipsed in the danger they pose to world peace by the fundamental opposition between Communist totalitarianism and the relatively free nations of the world, whose chief bulwark and support is the United States. By Communist totalitarianism in this context I mean primarily the Soviet Union. Mainland China ultimately may become a great or even greater threat to the U.S. and the Free World than the Soviet Union is today. If and when the current Sino-Soviet rift is healed, a rift that has been a moderating influence on both, the prospects for world peace will correspondingly decline.

It is generally recognized—de Tocqueville and Walter Lippman have been the most eloquent on this subject—that democracies have great difficulty in developing an effective and consistent foreign policy because the very demand for openness threatens the delicacy, complexity and the secrecy sometimes required to negotiate stubborn differences. The covenants of a free people should be open but they cannot be openly arrived at in the glare of publicity. To negotiate successfully when passions and fears are rife is not always possible when the negotiations themselves are public.

Granted all these difficulties, and others too, it still remains true that in a democracy no foreign policy can succeed if its basic direction does not have popular support. Most Americans, however, currently would be hard put to tell whether we really have a basic foreign policy, and if so, what it is.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, the chief adversary of the Free World, has a definite foreign policy and one which its rulers do not have to account for to its peoples. That policy is geared to its fundamental objective—an objective spelled out by a whole library of official documents, and reflected in its history. It has sought sometimes by threats and propaganda and sometimes by overt use of force to impose its political, social, and economic system on adjoining countries. It conceives this objective to be necessary not only for its *national defense* but for its *ideological defense* because of the possible subversive influence on its own institutions of the existence of free and open societies elsewhere. That is why it builds its walls and iron curtains, physical and mental, not so much to prevent alien elements from coming in but to prevent its own peoples from running out or becoming infected with dissident ideas.

This objective is the source of its unremitting ideological warfare against the Free World. From the very outset of its existence, the Soviet Union has been waging this war through the Communist International, the Cominform, foreign national parties and its growing powers of communication control. It frankly proclaims that whether it is called "coexistence" or "detente," this ideological warfare will continue and intensify.

The Cold War

The defense against this ideological warfare, and against the accompanying phenomena of episodic aggression after the Second World War, was called the Cold War. Despite its defects and defeats, the Cold War had at least this to be said for it—it prevented a *hot* world war. The great question for the future is whether and how we can prevent a "hot" war and a possible holocaust. If Cold War succeeds in doing that, its cost will be a small price to pay.

After all, what are the only alternatives to waging an intelligent Cold War of defense against totalitarian expansion and its Gulag Archipelago culture? If history can provide an answer, it is either a policy of appeasement which, bit by gradual bit, from one retreat in moments of crisis to another, leads to capitulation and ultimate surrender or it is a policy of appeasement which by encouraging bolder and bolder acts of aggression by the enemy, finally precipitates the war that nobody professes to want. Hitler, you will recall, claimed—and the English historian A.J.P. Taylor seems to support him—that he was lured into the Second World War. After the capitulation to him at Munich, he invaded Poland, assuming that if the West didn't resist when he invaded Czechoslovakia—"that distant country somewhere in Europe" as Chamberlain characterized it—it wouldn't resist when he invaded Poland, a country far more distant.

Actual war is *not* inevitable. Even the Communists who believe that their ultimate world-wide triumph is inevitable, no longer believe, as they once did, that their victory will inevitably come about through war. Khrushchev has revised both Lenin and Stalin who firmly believed and proclaimed that the inevitable victory of Communism would inevitably be won by war. Here the unexpected advances in technology have undermined one of the deeply rooted dogmas of Bolshevik-Leninist ideology.

Further, Cold War when intelligently waged to forestall "hot" war does not preclude limited agreements and treaties with the adversaries of free societies. But such agreements should be subject to at least three strictly enforced conditions. First, the consequences of any such agreement, especially where nuclear arms limitations and test bans are concerned, should not undermine the position of the free world to defend itself by conventional military means. Secondly—what has sometimes been lacking in implementing past agreements—the conditions must be based on genuine mutuality and reciprocity. Thirdly, before entering on new agreements and treaties, the provisions of the old ones must be faithfully fulfilled.

Anyone aware of the record of our relationships with the Soviet Union will have a vivid recollection of the repeated failures of the Soviet Union to live up to its treaties and agreements. Nonetheless, instead of insisting that the Soviet Union fulfill the terms of the Basic Principles of Agreement on May 29, 1972, between Brezhnev and Nixon before concluding new agreements, the United States proceeded to sign the 10-point Helsinki Declaration which in effect gave our official recognition and acceptance of Soviet violations of previous agreements with respect to Eastern Europe.

I have previously said, and it is necessary to repeat it, that no foreign policy can succeed in the long run in a democracy unless it enjoys popular support. Especially is this true if the policy involves risks and sacrifices. Popular support is largely a function of popular understanding of the basic issues in dispute between the communist world and our own. What, then, really is the issue for which we some day may be called upon to stake not only our fortunes and our honor but our very lives? I find disheartening the widespread failure to understand it on almost every level of American life.

We sometimes hear that the basic issue is between capitalism and socialism as economic systems. This is actually the constant theme song of Kremlin propaganda despite the absence of either free enterprise or socialism in their classic forms anywhere in the world. This counterposition of capitalism or socialism is not only false, for the specific content of economic decisions is not between capitalism and socialism but between more or less of either, it misses the central issue. Human beings do not fight for economic systems. Who would be willing to die

for capitalism? Certainly not the capitalists! Who would go to the barricades for a totally nationalized economy? Not even the Webbs. No, the issue is not between capitalism and socialism. *The issue is whether human beings are to be free to choose for themselves the economic system under which they wish to live or whether this is to be imposed upon them forcibly by a small group of self-selected rulers responsible to no one but themselves.*

Or we sometimes hear that the basic issue between the democratic and communist worlds is between religion and irreligion. I have a premonition we may hear more about this in the future. In the past, President Eisenhower, whose charming and vacuous smile matched his knowledge of international affairs, and who confessed himself stumped by General Zhukov's questions as to what ideals inspired the West, repeatedly warned us against the dangers of "atheistic communism" as if a communism that wasn't atheistic would be any less objectionable. No, the issue is not now, nor has it ever been, between religion and irreligion. It has always been the *freedom to choose* between them, the freedom to worship or not to worship one, many, or no gods; the right of one's conscience to believe or not to believe, or the dogmatic intolerance that makes the state power the arbiter of the faiths of man.

Main Issue

Nor is the issue between formalism or modernism in art or culture, on the one hand, or socialist realism, whatever that is, on the other. Once again the issue is *the right to choose freely one's own values or philosophy*, to experiment with new art forms and life styles, or to submit to a state-imposed view. Nor is the issue which system can outproduce the other as in the famous Nixon-Kruschev debate. The issue is rather whether those who produce society's goods and services have the right at least to some extent to determine, through their free trade unions and other voluntary associations, the conditions and rewards of work, or whether this is to be dictated by bureaucratic decrees backed by the coercive powers of the state.

In short, what is at stake is the most precious principle of liberal civilization whose roots were nurtured in Athens, Jerusalem, and Rome, and which began to bud at the time of the humanist Renaissance, and to flower when the American

Declaration of Independence made the principle of freely-given consent the hallmark of legitimate political sovereignty. When we say that social democracy puts freedom first, we mean that freedom becomes the touchstone of policy, a principle that cannot be compromised whether for the sale of machinery or oil or wheat or for the benefit of any special economic vested interests that look longingly at the markets of the Soviet Union and China, as their similars once did during the thirties at the markets of Japan and Germany.

When it comes to the principled defense of freedom, and to opposition to all forms of totalitarianism, let it be said that to its eternal credit, the organized labor movement in the United States, in contradiction to all other sectors of American life, especially in industry, the academy and the churches, has never faltered, or trimmed its sails. Its dedication to the ideals of a free society has been unsullied. Its leaders have never been Munichmen of the spirit.

The sober reality of the present moment is that the credibility of the United States as an active proponent of the principle of freedom first has come into question in important areas of the world. The ineptness and failures of our foreign policy initiatives, indeed of our feeble responses to the contumely, ingratitude and provocations of non-democratic powers, have contributed to the growth of neutralism in Western Europe which, if not reversed, can result in the Finlandization of Europe. This failure to develop an active policy in defense of freedom has eclipsed the will of many in our own country to defend it. I conceive it as the historic and continuous function of social democracy in international affairs to stress the centrality of the commitment to freedom first and its political relevance, not only in moments of crisis and confrontation, but in the day-to-day business of international agencies.

There Are Limits

We recognize that there are limits to American influence and power and that we must rely on the internal evolution and development of existing totalitarian countries toward freer horizons, not on threats and force of any kind. But just as we permit the waves of totalitarian propaganda to wash over our country, so we must beam the message of freedom, and

expressions of our solidarity and support for the Solzhenitsyns and Sakharovs, and the nameless hundreds of other dissenters in Iron Curtain countries. The Soviet regime, its leaders and its controlled press, have never scrupled to discuss American internal affairs even when by their denunciatory exaggerations they have contributed to the gaiety of nations. We should welcome any criticism from any foreign source, however unfriendly, learn from it where it is valid, and respond to it if it is invalid in programs of public education. *We should raise our voice in continued protest against repressions in any country where they occur.* We should not be deterred by the hypocritical outcry that we are interfering in internal affairs that are of no concern to us. Countries that are signatories to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights cannot win immunity from criticism of their repressive practices by classifying them as internal affairs. To those who put freedom first, whenever and wherever individuals are deprived of their human rights, it is never a purely internal affair.

Domestic Scene

I want to conclude with a few remarks about the domestic scene and the role of Social Democrats, U.S.A. in it. We are not a political party with our own candidates. We are not alone in our specific programs for more employment, more insurance, more welfare, less discrimination, less bureaucratic inefficiency. Our spiritual task should be to relate these programs and demands to the underlying philosophy of democracy, to express and defend those larger moral ideals that should inform, programs for which we wish to develop popular support. These large ideals are not Utopian blueprints but perspectives by which to judge the direction and quality of desirable social changes. Without these ideals we cannot formulate any conception of a good society or a better society. The demand for "More!" carries us beyond the *status quo* but "more" is not enough. We must know what is desirable and worth having before wanting more of it. We know that jobs are worth having, and programs of full employment at decent wages, lacking which a comprehensive insurance program should provide relief. But over and above this I believe we must raise our eyes to distant horizons to grasp a vision of society not only abundant and free but in which every person feels he has a significant stake and a sense

of worth and esteem regardless of the work he is doing.

It is not unduly optimistic to look forward to a period in which the malaise and evils of poverty, defined as acute deprivation, will be finally overcome. But I am not so optimistic as to assume that this will automatically eliminate what may be paradoxically called "the evils of affluence"—whose effects are observable currently among some of the most alienated sections of youth in our own and other democratic countries. Those who are depraved by drugs or consumed by an insatiable and self-defeating craving for excitement and sensation or caught up in criminal violence for ostensibly high ideals are not children of poverty suffering from acute physical want. What they suffer from most is *lack of meaning* in their lives, a vague discontent with normal life punctuated by outbursts of rage between listlessness and boredom.

The problem is vast and involves further study and research. But I believe that three fruitful suggestions deserve mention and require concrete implementation. One is to reawaken a sense of the importance of citizen participation in local government and its multiple activities. This kind of participation is an effective antidote to the impression of anonymity and helplessness in a complex world, and a perennial source for the feeling that one counts for something. This participation in local government must not be equated with a mindless drive towards decentralization. The universal enforcement of civil rights requires a strong central government just as a good national transportation system depends upon efficient coordination. But local government in a complex populous society can help to make the sense of citizenship continuous and vital. Another is to develop American variants on the practice of West Germany's codetermination in industry that can counteract to some extent the deadening effect of assembly lines and routinized mechanizations. We cannot, of course, transplant the German practice. The representatives of the consumer, too, must have a voice and a role.

Creative Fulfillment

Finally, more important and most difficult is the development of the sense of vocation or calling. Through the appropriate educational nurture, the community must provide the opportunities that give individuals a chance,

aside from the felicities of family life, to acquire an abiding sense of significance and meaning in life. I know of no more effective way of developing a center of interest around which human experience can be organized than by finding a career that makes a call upon the creative capacities of the individual.

Look around you and ask: who are the most integrated persons you know, who seem to have found themselves and, however one defines it, have achieved a satisfactory and happy life? I am confident that they will be persons who are characterized by one or both of two features: (1) they are able to love or be loved in their personal relationships, and (2) they have found a continuing self-fulfillment in their life's work. The first is largely a matter of luck. The second is the responsibility of social and educational institutions broadly conceived. For most people today, even when they are not in want, "earning one's living" and "living one's life" are quite different and opposed experiences. Our task as social democrats—a task not only educational

but social and political—is to move society in a direction in which for progressively larger numbers of human beings, "earning one's living" will be at the same time a satisfactory part of "living one's life." We are not Utopians and are aware that some tasks may be too boring or degrading to attract those seeking a meaningful career. Mechanization, part time work, rotating assignments, high compensation may help in getting this work done. Just as some individuals are willing to engage in very hazardous occupations to have time for leisure and amateur pursuits so others may undertake the less attractive tasks that must inescapably be performed. There will of course always be problems. But sufficient unto this day are the problems thereof.

We are few in number and limited in influence. So was the Fabian Society of Great Britain. But in time it reeducated a great political party and much of the nation. We must try to do the same.



David Dubinsky and A. Philip Randolph, two of the great leaders of American social democracy, were honored at a special luncheon held in conjunction with the National Convention of Social Democrats, U.S.A. Pictured here at the award ceremony are ILGWU President Sol C. Chaikin (left), Dubinsky, Randolph, Norman Hill who directs the A. Philip Randolph Institute, and SD National Chairman Bayard Rustin.

Social Democracy and America

1976 Convention Statement of
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America, in the year of its bicentennial celebration, is a country looking for new leadership and a new direction. A decade of acute crises—highlighted by Vietnam, urban disorders, Watergate, and a protracted recession—has strained the country's social fabric and weakened the authority of its institutions and established leaders.

Partly as a result of the turmoil of the recent past, some fundamental democratic principles have been brought under siege by a curious alliance of conservatives and liberals. A chorus of mixed voices intones the failures of democratic government, the inevitability of our economic woes, and the need to drastically reduce our expectations. Such defeatism does not stop at the water's edge. Like an echo of response, we hear of the decline of American influence and power in the world, and the inevitable—to some, even welcome—rise of forces hostile to democracy and human freedom.

To all this we clearly and forcefully say no. We don't think that America, crisis-ridden as it has been and remains, lacks the moral, intellectual, or material resources to eliminate poverty once and for all, end racial division, restore the health of our cities, maintain full employment, and do whatever else must be done to resolve the country's domestic difficulties. Nor do we think that America and its democratic allies are now, or inevitably will be, overwhelmed by the forces of totalitarianism. With all its problems, the democratic world has shown the ability to evolve and adapt, while the non-democratic world is stagnant and repressive, poorly concealing systemic failures with hollow triumphs at the U.N.

Our hopefulness derives in part from the sense that we have been vindicated in the stands we have taken since the fateful collapse of the liberal coalition a decade ago. On the crucial issue of political action, for example, we yielded no ground to the fashionable liberal notion that a progressive coalition could be built without the working class. The liberals who took this view, often out of elitist disdain for "Middle America," almost succeeded in driving lower and middle income workers out of the Democratic Party into the waiting arms of the Republicans. For a time this is what happened, and

conservative strategists developed theories of an emerging Republican majority to complement the inventive liberal doctrine that a New Class of professionals, in coalition with the urban underclass, could rule America. If the Democratic Party returns to national power this year, as we think it will, it will do so because it has reclaimed its working class base and ended the period of rule-or-ruin domination by the liberal Left.

Similarly, we feel vindicated in our defense of the labor movement as the preeminent force for progressive change in this society. During the past decade, a whole museum of movements claiming to speak for "the people" have come and gone, but the labor movement remains as always—the defender of the workers, the organizer of the poor, the only true people's lobby we have. Can the labor movement do more? Of course. The challenge of the unorganized presents itself, most immediately in the efforts to unionize the workers at J.P. Stevens. Labor's political action effort will undoubtedly have to expand, for the well-being of workers and the labor movement itself is increasingly being affected by government policies, not least by policies which would impose restrictive wage-price controls or other measures encroaching on the independence of the labor movement. And on the horizon looms the issue of industrial democracy, meaning the achievement by workers, through their unions, of increased control over the conditions of work and over the economic decisions which affect their lives. Here is but a partial agenda for labor containing far-reaching possibilities for growth and development which hardly bespeak a movement which is—or can afford to be—conservative or complacent. On the contrary, we feel confident that the labor movement will meet new challenges with the same level-headed pragmatism and broad view of its own interests which enabled it to achieve its present place in American life.

Full Employment

Committed as ever to the goal of a full employment economy, we also feel vindicated in having resisted the arguments of those people, mostly conservatives but also some liberals, who have held that high unemployment was needed as a remedy for inflation. The Nixon and Ford Administrations' anti-inflationary policies have led to an unprecedented waste of economic resources. Almost one-third of the country's industrial capacity stands idle, while some 10 million workers are either unemployed or able to find only part-

time work. The economic loss caused by this enforced idleness is prodigious: \$220 billion annually in the output of goods and services (according to conservative estimates by the Department of Commerce), a figure larger than the GNP of every country in the world except that of the Soviet Union, Japan, West Germany, and France. Such idleness and waste have had incalculable effects on the nation, damaging the lives of millions of individuals and families, aggravating the urban crisis, sharply reducing much of the purchasing power of the consumer—and therefore production too—and the resources available to the government to meet social problems.

All this has been done in the name of curbing inflation, while the actual result has been "stagflation," the combination of economic stagnation and rising prices. Stagflation is not a paradox but a predictable economic consequence of high interest rates (which restrict economic activity while increasing the price of the prime economic commodity—money), artificially induced shortages (which inflate the price of such commodities as food, energy and housing), and reduced productivity (which raises unit costs of production and thus leads to price increases in price-administered, oligopolistic sectors of the economy). It follows, therefore (and has been statistically demonstrated by Leon Keyserling, among others), that the level of inflation bears an inverse relationship to the rate of growth and the level of employment. Low growth, far from being a cure for inflation, is one of its main causes.

As a first step, the government should respond affirmatively to George Meany's call for a program of "economic planning for full employment" and abandon the present policy which deliberately denies several million able-bodied citizens the opportunity for productive work and self-reliance. Full employment will not be an objective easily achieved. Millions of workers are now unemployed as a result of structural incongruities in the economy, e.g., urban workers living beyond travel range of manufacturing plants that have moved out of the city, a temporary surplus of untrained young workers in the labor force. Long-range planning will be needed to correct these incongruities. But there is no excuse for the present situation in which nearly 30 percent of the industrial capacity of the country is allowed to stand idle. This situation can be reversed through government monetary and fiscal policies that enable this country to fulfill its economic potential.

Economic Growth

In keeping with our commitment to economic growth, we have argued against those who have urged restrictions on growth in the interest of achieving environmental objectives. Economic growth is not an end in itself, but it is a means to achieve vital social objectives, such as ending poverty, relieving the plight of the cities, and achieving a more equal distribution of wealth. Without a high rate of growth, it is simply not realistic to assume that very much progress can be made in solving some of America's most difficult social problems. Ironically, even the protection of the environment is dependent upon high growth rates, since environmental improvement will require vast capital investment which is not feasible in a stagnant economy.

The economic recession draws attention to another issue, that of racial equality, where the views advocated by Social Democrats have particular relevance. In a seminal essay written more than a decade ago, Bayard Rustin observed that the basic programmatic objective of the black struggle in the post-protest period must be the achievement of full economic equality. Toward that end, it would be necessary to emphasize issues of class over issues of race; which is to say that economic issues affecting the total society, such as employment, housing, education, and health care, would increasingly take precedence over racial issues affecting blacks alone.

Blacks Suffer

The terrible consequences of the recession for American blacks has underlined the importance of this analysis. In 1969 black family income was 64 percent of white family income, up from 51 percent in 1958. By 1974 the figure was back down to 58 percent. The black unemployment rate in 1975 was double the national average, while the unemployment rate for black teenagers was a catastrophic and socially explosive 37 percent. The recession was undermining the gains made by blacks in the 1960's, while it also deprived the government of the revenues needed to relieve the plight of the black poor. In response to these setbacks some have proposed the imposition of racial quotas as a way to meet black needs. But quotas, besides being divisive and undemocratic, do not address the underlying problem of scarcity and low growth. Fortunately, the stake which blacks have in a more productive economy, and in policies which will promote their own economic and social well being, is shared by whites as well. It

is this common interest that Social Democrats try to build upon in developing strategies and programs that will lead to a more equal social order.

Foreign Policy

While we, as Social Democrats, have spoken clearly and forcefully on issues of politics, labor, economics, and race, we have also been profoundly concerned with the direction of American foreign policy and its affect on the state of democracy in the world. Four years ago, at its 1972 convention, Social Democrats, U.S.A. warned of "a mood of pervasive euphoria" which was taking hold in the country in response to President Nixon's claim that he had achieved "a generation of peace." Assessing the mood at the time, we stated that "The conflict between East and West is presumed over, while the foundations are being laid for a new and delicate balance of power. Liberals welcome the end of 'Cold War paranoia,' while the conservatives avidly embrace the prospect of doing business with Moscow and Peking." While identifying with the longing of the American people for a durable peace, we cautioned that it had not yet been achieved and warned that its achievement could "be undermined by illusions about the world situation."

The events on the world scene since the adoption of this statement have demonstrated how premature were the predictions of peace and how sound were our own reservations. The first shock came in October 1973 when the Soviet Union, in blatant violation of the detente understanding agreed to by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972, conspired with and armed Egypt and Syria in their aggression against Israel. Thereafter the shocks followed hard upon one another. In Vietnam the Communists, armed with Soviet weapons, demonstrated their contempt for the Paris accords by launching a massive assault against the South which ended in total military victory. The fall of Cambodia at the same moment was followed by the most ruthless campaign of terror and slaughter since the Nazi holocaust. In Angola, Soviet arms and Cuban troops enabled the Communist-backed faction to win a military victory against forces which had greater support among the population. And in Portugal the Communists attempted—unsuccessfully—to seize power through a coup d'état.

Throughout this period of so-called detente, the Soviet arms build-up continued at an alarming pace, reaching 15 percent of the Soviet GNP, compared to 5.4 percent for the United States. As a result, in absolute terms the Russians now

outspend the U.S. on defense by some 40 percent. This military power, former U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has said, "may be employed directly, but it is more likely to be exploited indirectly to extract political, economic or military concessions." Secretary Kissinger himself has observed that "as Soviet power grows ... the temptation to achieve political positions commensurate with that power may also grow."

The detente policy was originally proposed by Secretary Kissinger as a means of moderating Soviet political and military behavior by involving the Russians in a broad pattern of economic relationships which would give them an incentive for cooperation. The fact that the policy, as stated by the U.S., constituted a form of appeasement—we would be trying to buy their good will—did not affect the optimism of U.S. officials or the appetites of U.S. businessmen who looked forward to lucrative deals with Moscow. It would be no exaggeration to point out that from the American point of view, detente has not achieved its political objectives.

The Russians, from the very beginning, had a much more ambitious conception of detente. Economically, they hoped to procure capital and technology from the West which might enable them to overcome economic backwardness and totalitarian stagnation. A second objective was to pacify their Western front at a time of deteriorating relations with China, and to defend against the possibility of U.S.-Chinese collusion against Moscow. Finally, they hoped to disarm ideologically and politically divide their Western opponents, so that they could pursue expansionist policies in selected areas while simultaneously achieving specific diplomatic objectives, such as the Helsinki accord.

The imbalance in United States and Soviet objectives in detente—the U.S. wanting to preserve the military and political status quo while expanding its markets, while the Russians pursue forward policies on all fronts—points up the futility of detente as conceived by the U.S. The only way detente could have become an effective policy capable of advancing democratic interests was if it had as one of its prime objectives the softening of Soviet totalitarianism. As the Soviet historian and dissident Andrei Amalrik has pointed out, "It is difficult to imagine a state combining constant suppression and violence internally with peaceful behavior and accommodation externally. ... Therefore, any relaxation in the internal policies of the U.S.S.R. should be desirable to the Americans not only out of humanitarian con-

siderations. It is also vitally important to them for reasons of their own security, and therefore can be regarded as one of the objectives of U.S. policy." Not only has it not been U.S. policy to press for humanitarian changes in the Soviet system, but the American President refused even to receive Alexander Solzhenitsyn for fear of offending his partner in detente.

The unfortunate fact is that U.S. foreign policy in general has given an exceedingly low priority to the issue of democracy. A recently published State Department "overview" of U.S. foreign policy, for example, does not even mention the well-being of democracy abroad as one of the objectives of U.S. policy. There is one mention of "moral purpose" and a passing reference to "standards to which the American people can rally." But this is immediately countered with the warning that "when policy becomes excessively moralistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous" and "may fall prey to ineffectual posturing or adventurist crusades."

Though the U.S., to its discredit, might eschew any attempt to "interfere with," i.e. to moderate, the repressive policies of totalitarian states, the Russians are quite bold in proclaiming that detente does not prohibit them from imperialistic meddling. In his speech to the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Brezhnev emphasized that "Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and cannot abolish or alter, the laws of the class struggle ... There is no room for neutralism and compromise in the struggle between [Communism and its opponents]."

The Soviet policy of imperialistic expansion under the cover of detente inevitably had to arouse deep concern in this country. The American people's skepticism of Soviet intentions has been evident in this election year, leading the President to officially abandon the word detente, and the Secretary of State to modify policy formulations so as to give a higher priority to relations with democratic allies than totalitarian foes. Apprehension over Soviet expansion and American retreat has also been expressed by European leaders, and by leaders of non-Communist countries of Africa and Asia. The moment is opportune, in our view, for a reassertion of American democratic values and commitments.

The principle underlying the Jackson Amendment to the Foreign Trade Bill—that the U.S. should use its economic leverage for democratic ends—should be an integral part of a democratic foreign policy. This principle should be applied particularly in the case of relations with Soviet bloc countries where political considerations continue

to be of overriding importance. The fact that the indebtedness of COMECON countries to the West soared to \$32 billion in 1975 (ironically, at a time when the West was undergoing, according to Communist propaganda, an acute "crisis of capitalism") indicates the extent of their need for Western capital, technology, and consumer goods, and therefore the strong bargaining position of the democracies. The need to use this economic power to further democratic ends has been made evident by the Communists' cynical disregard for the human rights provisions of the accord they signed at Helsinki last August. Since they clearly view such "agreements" as meaningless pieces of paper (just two weeks after the accord was signed, Brezhnev said it was not "of a binding nature") they can be held accountable on human rights issues only through the exercise of firm and concrete Western measures to assure compliance. Full support must be given to dissident intellectuals and movements inside the Eastern European bloc countries and the Soviet Union who have the courage to demand freedoms, for they represent the hopes and aspirations of millions who, suffering from these oppressive totalitarian regimes, desire substantive political change from within their societies. Tying economic cooperation from the West to progress in the human rights field is one such measure that should be used. Far from being an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of other states, a coordinated Western policy to encourage freedom of emigration from Communist countries, democratization, and the freer flow of ideas and information would be a major step toward genuine detente.

Though few Americans retain illusions about detente, there still exists the view in some quarters that the U.S. should not consider the coming to power of Communist parties in Western Europe a danger to Western security or to European democracy. Some would even welcome such a development. While much has been said of the "independence" of the French, Italian, and Spanish Communist parties, it would be premature in our view to conclude that movements schooled in the philosophy and tactics of Leninism have now become genuine partisans of democracy. Moscow may have difficulty keeping these parties in rein, but a problem for Moscow does not necessarily translate itself into a gain for the West. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has been correct in pointing to the international dangers of a Communist ascension to power in Western Europe. It is inconceivable to us, for example, that NATO could survive with Communists in power

in Italy and France, and with other European countries having increasingly to accommodate to the demands of Communist or pro-Communist elements within their borders for the adoption of "peaceful," "anti-imperialist" foreign policies. It is also hard to imagine that under such circumstances the European Economic Community, which is dedicated to a strong and united Europe, could achieve its objectives. It would probably become, far more so than it is now, a source of advanced technology for the backward and inefficient economies of the Soviet bloc.

A democratic policy toward the Soviet Union should be one aspect of a consistent and confident U.S. commitment to international democracy. Daniel P. Moynihan's unequivocal defense of freedom at the United Nations, which was acclaimed by the American public, has set a standard for statesmanship that American policy makers would do well to follow. On many vital issues today, the opportunity exists for the United States to effectively advance the interests of democracy. In the Middle East, for example, the United States has in Israel a democratic friend capable of defending itself but also deeply in need of U.S. military, political, and economic support. Such support should be given unstintingly, without demanding political concessions from Israel and without compromising it by "even-handed" offers of support to Israel's enemies.

United States assistance is also needed by the democratic state of Portugal. The victorious struggle led by the Portuguese Socialists against Communist efforts to impose a totalitarian dictatorship is one of the most hopeful developments in recent years. The Portuguese struggle is a credit to the socialist movement worldwide and is the best answer to those Spenglerian pessimists who see democracy as doomed. Now that democracy in Portugal has survived this fearful test, the U.S. should be ready with economic assistance to help Portugal overcome its most difficult problems of unemployment, inflation, and the absorption of hundreds of thousands of Angolan refugees.

The democratic evolution now hopefully beginning in Spain offers the United States another opportunity to advance the democratic cause. By using its influence with the Spanish government to quicken the dismantling of the Franco dictatorship, the U.S. could disassociate itself from the Franco heritage, weaken the forces of the right in Spain, and help insure a peaceful transition to democracy. While the United States could not hope to have an equal effect upon India, it should none-

theless insist upon a return to democracy there and use whatever influence it has to restrain the Indian dictatorship. A similar policy should be followed with respect to Chile.

Finally, Secretary Kissinger's Lusaka declaration was a welcome if also belated statement of the U.S. government's desire to see early majority rule in Rhodesia and independence for Namibia. The enthusiasm with which it was received by African leaders indicates that the past errors of the U.S. in Africa are not irreparable, especially if the new policy is backed up by concrete measures (such as the repeal of the Byrd Amendment permitting the import of Rhodesian chrome) to bring an end to minority rule and apartheid in Southern Africa.

These are but some of the issues now confronting the United States where a democratic foreign policy could begin to be implemented. The list is hardly exhaustive, though it does indicate the direction that U.S. policy should take. As with domestic policy, the key question is not whether the United States is capable of taking this course, but whether it can generate leadership which can shape policies consistent with the democratic values of the people. Herein lies the key political problem of the nation, for the defeatism that has crept into American political life during the past decade is not the product of public disaffection with America and its possibilities. Rather, it is among the elites of the country where we find declining faith in the possibilities of American democracy.

Broadly speaking, there are two distinct American elites which have produced a great part of the leadership of the country over the years. One elite is drawn from the intellectual world and is strongly represented in the professions. It is this elite which constitutes and espouses what passes for liberalism in America today. The other, drawn mostly from the business world, is identified with American conservatism. Each of these elites, while exceedingly well-endowed with technical skills and material resources, has undergone a process of progressive demoralization and alienation from the people that has sapped its ability to provide positive leadership for the country.

The intellectual elite, which has grown substantially in recent years, has found an institutional base of its "opposition culture" in the universities and the media. Its efforts to achieve national political power through the so-called New Politics movement have failed miserably, not least because its brand of radicalism, elitist and anti-American, prevented it from developing broad support among the American people. Its attitudes on world affairs

have been characterized by a shameful double standard (according to which denunciation of Chilean oppression is *de rigueur* but criticism of Cambodian genocide is *verboten*), while its critique of American society has led increasingly to proposals to resolve social conflict (labor-management or racial disputes) by government fiat (wage-price controls as a substitute for collective bargaining, the imposition of racial quotas). Given the unacceptability of these views to the broad American public, it is hardly surprising that recently the lead article in a prominent liberal journal talked of "the demise of liberalism" as a national political force.

Official American conservatism is hardly in better shape. Conservatives live in a world of contradictions, synchronously defending laissez-faire economics and corporate oligopoly, individual opportunity and rigid social stratification. They inveigh against government efforts to protect the individual from economic misfortune, though they are unwilling in practice to turn the clock back to the days before Social Security and unemployment compensation. Proud of the productivity of corporate capitalism, they view production as an end in itself, divorced from social norms of equity and justice. They lack vision and purpose, a failing that is not unrelated to their incapacity to formulate a convincing ideological self-defense, to convey an image of self-confidence, or to assume moral or political leadership. They are, in a word, economically powerful but politically impotent.

A Paradox

This paradox was foreseen by the late Joseph Schumpeter who prophesied the political decline of the capitalist class. The bourgeois, he wrote, "can impress by what people may expect from his economic performance, he can argue his case, he can promise to pay out money or threaten to withhold it, he can hire the treacherous services of a *condottiere* or politician or journalist. But that is all and all of it is greatly overrated as to its political value." He would, moreover, think nothing of selling valuable technology to totalitarians, irrespective of political considerations, since "This is the way the bourgeois mind works—always will work even in sight of the hangman's rope."

The defeatism of Western conservatives, therefore, should hardly come as a surprise. They cannot inspire loyalty because they cannot inspire. They cannot establish a political base because they lack roots among the people. They are immobilized in the face of the ideological challenge of the

totalitarian left, for they have pledged their loyalty to a class that is ideologically neutral, determining its attitude toward Communism by the same yardstick that it judges everything else: profitability. And on this basis, lacking a democratic commitment, they are quite willing to collude with the devil.

If not liberalism or conservatism, then what? The rise of a politics of religious commitment (manifesting itself in an extreme form in the spread of cults) is a response to the political crisis caused by the decline of the dominant ideologies. While giving evidence of a broadly felt need for a reawakened belief in positive values, such politics by its very nature does not offer solutions to practical problems. It constitutes an outlet for frustration, not a program for change.

As America enters its third century, it is clearly in need of a new political framework within which it can deal with the immensely complex problems it faces at home and the equally immense challenges it faces abroad. It needs a "new politics" that can end the sterile polarization between a carping, negative liberalism and a privileged, reflexively defensive conservatism, both of them united by their lack of faith in America and the possibilities of democracy. Such a new politics would be above all democratic, combining a belief in democratic government as the means by which ordinary people can influence their circumstances with specific policies to extend democracy to every sphere of social existence.

There is no simple blueprint for achieving the radical extension of democracy that we seek. Government of the people, by the people, and for the people is an ideal which in reality requires a careful delineation of the proper role of government and an appreciation of the role of non-governmental institutions and voluntary organizations in a democratic society. In promoting the social and economic well-being of the people, government has the twofold responsibility of maintaining an economy of prosperity and doing that which is necessary to protect the individual from economic misfortune. The first objective can be achieved through the intelligent use of fiscal and monetary policies to assure an economy of growth, low levels of unemployment, socially useful production, and so forth. The second objective requires comprehensive and imaginative programs for the protection of the elderly, the poor, and the disabled; and also programs to guarantee adequate housing, medical care, education and (where the private sector cannot handle it) employment.

Limitations

This is a broad and ambitious role for government. But there are and should be limitations to government. Marx's vision of the withering away of the state can never realistically come to pass. But the concept of a state whose power is no greater than that which is required for it to perform its appropriate functions is both realistic and prudent. As Social Democrats, we view the expansion of industrial democracy and the strengthening of workers' organizations as essential ways of improving democratic life and individual fulfillment. These and other areas of autonomy in economic life must be encouraged, even as government performs its tasks of ensuring high rates of growth and economic well-being.

A politics that is inspired by democratic ideals cannot at any time, and particularly in this world in which we live, concern itself only with internal affairs. Solzhenitsyn is right: There are no internal affairs left on our crowded earth. The menacing presence of massive totalitarian systems gives this insight an urgent, compelling significance. The appropriate response is not merely to develop means to guard the security of democratic societies against the totalitarian threat, let alone is it merely to work out balance of power arrangements to preserve international stability. Democracies will have to be protected, and balance of power considerations are unavoidable. But to deal only in these terms would be to adopt a losing, defensive policy, seeking to guard a status quo that cannot be preserved when other powerful forces exist that seek to overturn it.

Democracy can only survive if all democracies cooperate among themselves and work to *expand* democratic civilization. Totalitarianism is, after all, a most vulnerable system—politically oppressive, economically inefficient, culturally stagnant, requiring terror because it cannot inspire loyalty. With all the attention that has been devoted to the crisis of democracy, little emphasis has been given to its strengths—it is the most advanced form of civilization that mankind has ever known. Vibrant, open, and generally affluent, democratic societies allow for the possibility of both individual liberty and economic advancement. Even in its imperfect form, democratic civilization represents the basis for the development of what the jailed Yugoslav philosopher Mihajlo Mihajlov has called a "new all-encompassing antitotalitarian ideology."

To us that ideology is social democracy. If the fundamental struggle of our time is between democracy and totalitarianism, it is increasingly also becoming a struggle between *social* democracy and totalitarianism. And this will be all to the good. For what other ideology can more confidently or more effectively repudiate the spurious ideological claims of "left-wing" despots? What other movement can hold up a positive ideal of equality in freedom which can simultaneously give hope to millions and shake the ideological foundations of totalitarianism?

Social democracy is a reasoned, sober, political philosophy of hope. With sound principles, roots among the people, and high aspirations, its ideas and values are increasingly relevant to America as the country enters its third century.



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Bayard Rustin, National Chairman Social Democrats, USA

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